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A. Colonization Rivalry  In Africa 
European States attended a new kind of competition with the Columbus, Vasco de Gama, Magellan and 
Drake’s exploration voyages. This competition was among the European powers but the competition area was out 
of Europe, on the lands of India, Africa and America. The sides were trying to save the lands under their 
dominance by both diplomacy and wars. After the European powers’ discoveries of marine lines in 15th and 16th 
centuries, the war in Europe gradually spread out of Europe1. 
Europeans’ interest towards Africa first arose thanks to explorers. In fact, these explorations were aimed to 
find a new way to India rather than explore Africa. At the beginning of these exploration voyages, the role of 
Africa was not more than being a resting-place. By following the Portuguese till the end of 18th century, 
Spaniards, French, Dutch and English people were contended with constructing influential trade harbors on the 
coasts of African continent. But soon, it was realized that African ports / harbors should not remain as a resort and 
there were some other opportunities. Gold mines and rich slave potential attracted these powers. Especially black 
slaves were indispensable opportunity for the need for many employees of Europeans in Europe and America. 
Thus, the effort, which was spend for the exploration of new ways to India and exploration of this continent, was 
soon directed towards the invasion of these lands.  
Some of the attempts towards the invasion of African continent, such as the invasion of the Northern Africa, 
were about the control of The Mediterranean Sea rather than the control of Africa2. The anxieties and ambitions of 
other European powers against the French desire to take the control over The Mediterranean Sea and the struggle 
against pirates were reasons lead to invasion of Northern Africa by European powers. European invader powers 
used two different methods in order to settle in Africa.  The first method was to settle in a friendly country that 
was under protection of this country with a friendly approach aiming modernization.  The second method was an 
actual invasion by directly using army power. While France used the first method, Britain generally preferred the 
second method.  
When we look into 19th century, we see that Britain, which was started the colony competition later than the 
others, was on the ahead of Spain and Portugal. In the 19th century on the one hand Britain was trying to save its 
national benefits in the new world, American continent, on the other hand it was trying to handle the control over 
the old world, the Far East and Africa.  
The main factor, which directed European states to colonization after 1850s, was economic benefits3. With 
the development of industrial activity in Europe, some problems came out. Because industrialization provided 
much more production than old production capacities, the population of European states became unable to 
consume these products. So, every industrialized European state faced with a production extra. And they faced 
with the problem to find new markets. Therefore, raw material was a problem of industry. The limited raw 
material sources of Europe were under the production capacity of developing industry. Because of this, countries, 
competing on industrialization, were competing on controlling lands that were rich about raw material sources.   
European forces invaded African continent by starting from coasts and gone towards inland. Every state was 
invading lands behind their trade harbors and spreading towards its surrounding. So, there occurred a few 
encounters among colonist powers. But the Germany’s completion of national unity and entrance to colony 
competition caused inevitable fights. Germany did not have strategic ports as the other powers had. Because of 
this, it directly tried to establish a colony in the Middle Africa. But these lands were less rich and harder to 
communicate than other regions were. Germany’s appearance on the scene speeded colony competition up4. Every 
colonist powers wanted to establish a sovereignty that would at least provide a communication from one end to 
the other instead of total communication. Portuguese were trying to establish “Angola – Mozambique” line, 
whereas French were trying to establish “Dakar – Cibuti” line and English were trying to establish “Cairo – 
Capetown” line. In fact these lines were making each other impossible, as it is easy to be understood on the map. 
Egypt, which was the northern part of English dream Cairo – Capetown line, had a special importance 
because of this. On the other words, in the 19th century for Britain losing Egypt meant that it would not provide 
control over Africa and lose prestige among the other big powers. As a result of its politics, Britain invaded Egypt 
in 1882 and invaded Sudan as well and added to Egypt. Thus, they dreamed to establish an African Empire tied to 
Britain in addition to its Southern African colonies5. The most important item of Britain’s colonization politics 
was preventing India away from the fight and the security of roads to India. The road of Britain’s Egypt and 
Middle East politics in 19th century continued as connected with this indispensable condition. 
The obvious domination of France in Europe and out of Europe in 18th century started to leave its place to the 
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domination of Britain at the very beginning of 19th century. The beginning of Britain’s taking the domination in 
the world and the Middle east was started with its defeating France in 1801 in Egypt, which had been invaded by 
Napoleon in 1798, and making this eternal rival country go away from the region. Nevertheless, Britain eliminated 
its another rival country, Russia, in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea with the Canakkale agreement of 1809 that 
entailed the Straits to be closed. So, against the Russian national aim to go down to reach warm seas, Britain used 
the Ottoman land as a tampon region in its benefit struggle with the Russia in 19th century. As this politics 
required, Britain accepted the Afghan Mountains in front of its rich eastern colony, India, Caucasian Mountains in 
the Middle East, the Balkans in the west, and the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles -to prevent its coming down to 
the Aegean Sea and The Mediterranean Sea- as a barrier against Russia. On the other hand, parallel to the change 
in power balance in the world, Ottoman Empire, which thought that it was inevitable to take support of a big 
power to save its unity and power, left its old friend in 17th and 18th century, France, and provided friendly and 
close relations with Britain in 19th century. But the friendly relations between Ottoman Empire and Britain 
continued until the last quarter of 19th century. Ottoman – English relations started to change after the Berlin 
Agreement in 1878. Although Britain’s taking over Cyprus Island from Ottoman Empire in 1878 seemed to aim 
saving lands of Ottoman State, it was nothing more than the desire to grasp portion. After that, Britain’s politics 
against Ottoman Empire was shaped with the hypothesis about the inevitability of collapse and demolish of this 
state. Therefore, Britain would either itself invade and govern this strategic Ottoman lands or provide the 
establishment of some satellite states on these lands and take the control indirectly6.  
On the other hand, we see that Germany was come on the scene at the end of 19th century adding to France 
and Russia as a rival to Britain in this region.  At the first glance, while the Middle East meant to Britain 
important for the security of roads towards India, the aim of France and Russia was taking portion from the lands 
of the demolishing Ottoman Empire and become dominant at the Eastern Mediterranean7.  The Middle East was 
important for Germany because it was a part of Germany’s politics about establishing a barrier on the line of 
Britain and India. Germany’s politics was about becoming influential on this line which connects Britain to the 
Far East or reaching India by railway on the ground and benefit from the affluence8. 
 
B. Colonist powers in the Eastern Africa 
 
The European powers’ interest towards the southern and western coasts of Arabian Peninsula and Eastern 
Africa started in the early eras. While this interest was trade centered at the beginning, later it turned into 
strengthening trade benefits with politics. Merchants and sailors of Arabian Peninsula and Arabian Bay had been 
carrying on their seasonal trade with the Far East for 3000 years by putting out to The Indian Ocean. Arabs that 
trade with especially Indian Peninsula and China settled the eastern coasts of Africa in 8th century. After that, in 
10th and 11th centuries, some small Arabian colonies appeared at the eastern coasts of Africa. The most important 
of them were Kilifi, settled from Mogadisu at the north to Delgado Cape at the south, Malindi and Mombassa. 
Sultans were governing “city states”, which were established in Africa until the end of 15th century and until 
the appearance of Portuguese in the Red Sea and the southern and eastern coast of Africa at the beginning of 16th 
century, and they were living a comfortable life with their income from sea trade. The merchants under protection 
of these sultans were trading products such as ivory, carnation and black pepper. In addition to this, they were 
exporting gold and black slaves to Arabia, Persia and India. At the same time, in Arabian and African markets, 
they sold textile products that they bought from Persia and India. Arabian writers and travelers of this era, who 
gave this information, such as Mesudi, İdrisi, Yakuti and İbn Batuta praised the high civilization level and 
commercial development fulfilled by Southern African Coasts.  
Also Vasco da Gama witnessed the Arabian dominance in the cities settled along the coast when he visited 
Mozambique, Mombassa and Malindi during his first travel towards India (1497 - 1499). 
The dominance of Arabs finished in The Indian Ocean after the first decade of Portuguese arrival to this 
region at the very beginning of 16th century. The new masters of the region started to destroy the economic and 
social incomes of cities on the coast by carrying out a merciless monopolist trade politics. After living under 
pressure of Portuguese dominance nearly two centuries, coast cities in the Southern Africa were rid of this 
situation only after the expanding politics started by Mehmet Ali Pasha and carried on by Khediv İsmail Pasha on 
the West Coast of the Red Sea. The Sultan of Oman’s support on the East Coast of the Red Sea was also another 
factor to prevent expansion of Western powers towards Eastern and Middle Africa and their entrance to the Red 
Sea. 
On the other hand, Oman established a strong authority on the right opposite of Indian Peninsula by 
expanding its central authority in southeast Arabia. This sultan authority stood out as a nautical state, which was 
bordered with Rubal Hali Desert on the land and The Indian Ocean in the sea. They gained new authority areas in 
the Eastern Africa. But after the arrival of colonist powers to this region, Oman sultans’ influence in Eastern 
Africa was diminished and ceased. Britain speeded up their colonization politics in Zenzibar, Kenya (East Africa 
of Britain) and Uganda and then established Protectorate administration on Mombassa in 1895. After this date, 
Eastern and Middle Africa become under the administration of Britain’s Protectorate administration. But there 
were some other old rivals from Europe to disturb Britain. Britain was one step ahead of the others in “Africa 
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competition” of European colonists, which gained speed especially after second half of 19th century.  
 
C. The Strategic Value Of The Region 
 
After the opening of Suez Canal in 1869, the importance of Egypt, the Middle East and the Red Sea 
increased. After that, the region became a strategic key point. European super powers began a new competition to 
invade or gain benefit from port cities, islands, islets and even rockies on the Red Sea coasts, near Suez Canal and 
near Bab el-Mendeb Strait. That was because, the ships that had been going the way around the Cape of Good 
Hope got rid of going 4000 miles on the way to east after the opening of the canal. This advantage once again 
revealed the importance of the Mediterranean – Suez – the Red Sea line and made Britain closely interested in The 
Mediterranean and the Middle East related with the trade in the region9. 
At the beginning, Britain was opposed the construction of Suez Canal according to its “Eastern politics”, 
trade benefits and control over seas politics. Because they failed in these politics, they searched for the way for 
gaining control over the Canal. So, they took the value of the Canal in favor of itself by buying Khediv of Egypt 
Ismail Pasha’s shares10. Here, it will useful to remind that more than half of the world industrial production was 
produced by Britain during this era and how Britain needed control over one of the maritime trade lines, Suez as 
well as Gibraltar and Malta.  
On the other hand, Britain considered Russia as the main treat against its eastern politics and realized the vital 
importance of The Mediterranean – Suez – the Red Sea line after the opening of Suez Canal. So it focused on 
politics about how to hold Russia away from this region. Therefore, to settle and become influential in the region 
before the arrival of Russia became one of the essentials of Britain’s eastern politics.  
Britain’s attempts to secure roads to the Far East increased after the beginning of 19th century. There were 
four ways to reach India and China for Britain or any other European state; 
1) The Mediterranean Sea– Suez – the Red Sea line 
2) The Mediterranean Sea– Syria – Iraq- Iran- India 
3) The Mediterranean Sea– Syria- Iraq- Basra Bay 
4) The Atlantic Ocean- the Cape of Good Hope- the Indian Ocean 
As it can be understood at first glance, the most direct and the easier of these ways is the Mediterranean Sea– 
Suez – the Red Sea line. “Security of this line” had a vital importance for Britain. Until Berlin Agreement in 1878, 
by supporting Ottoman’s land unity, Britain carried on its politics on using Ottoman State as a guard of the ways 
going around The Mediterranean towards India. But after Berlin Agreement in 1878, Britain changed its politics 
and carried out politics about speeding up the collapse of Ottoman State and gaining strategic portions at the end 
of this. The need for securing “roads to the eastern” on his own resulted in the invasion of Egypt. Because it was 
vitally important for Britain to settle in a strategic base in order to defend roads to India after the decline of 
Ottoman State. Egypt was containing the strategic value, which Britain wanted, with its political, military, trade 
and control over sea features. Britain had invaded some important places of Indian roads before. The invasion of 
Britain in Egypt in 1882 was not a surprise because of its invasions towards Gibraltar in 1704, Malta in 1800, 
Aden port city in 1839 and Cyprus in 1878.  
All of the big powers, which wanted to establish hegemony in Asia, Europe and Africa by carrying out 
expansion politics, wanted to take the control of the Mediterranean according to their global strategies11. 
Otherwise it was impossible for them to carry out their expansionist strategies without meeting an obstacle. 
Britain required a station on the way to east for its overseas trade and a store for its industrial products. On the 
other hand, streamers took the place of sailboats that were sent to India after the opening of Suez Canal by Britain.  
Streamers required secure harbors to load coal. When these requirements were considered, the invasion of places 
near Suez Canal and strategic places in the Red Sea was very important for Britain.  
For the countries interested in trade in this region, the opening of Suez Canal brought the increase of the 
importance of The Mediterranean Sea, The Red Sea and some strategic islands in the Oman Sea. Britain had 
captured Malta (1800) and Cyprus (1878) in the Mediterranean Sea, Perim Island in the Red Sea (1857), Scotra 
and Couri islands in the Oman Sea. On the other hand, some port cities on the coast of Arabian Peninsula and on 
the western coast of Africa continent had already been under control of Britain because of security of maritime 
trade lines towards East. Thus, there remained just a point for Britain’s complete control over the Mediterranean 
Sea– Suez – the Red Sea line. It was naturally Egypt that was overlooking the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. This 
strategic importance was on the background of British invasion in Egypt12. When we look at the invasion politics 
followed by Britain, we see that it carried out the politics about taking complete control over The Mediterranean 
Sea– Suez – the Red Sea line. As this politics required, it invaded Barbera at the opposite of Aden in 1884 and 
Sudan in 189813.Therefore, it secured the south coasts of Arabian Peninsula between 1886 and 1904. It also 
expanded its influence area by taking control of south el-Ahza State and Necef which had been under control of 
Ottoman Empire. Thus, all these expansions were steps about Britain’s politics to found a total control over The 
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Mediterranean Sea– Suez – the Red Sea line14.  
 
D. Ottoman Sovereignity In The Region 
Ottoman State’s adding Egypt and Syria in 1517 changed the balances in The East Mediterranean and in The 
Red Sea. As a dominant power in the region, Ottoman State secured its southern borders till the end of 18th 
century. Portuguese, who entered the Red Sea with the decline of Mameluke State, no longer could not acted as 
ease as before and they left soon15.After Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem came into Ottoman authority, all related 
land roads to Hajj (Damascus- Mecca, Cairo- Mecca) came under control of Ottoman Padishahs, in Istanbul. This 
provided Ottoman Padishahs to claim to have a spiritual superiority, which the other countries had not, and to be 
an administration center with the sovereignty of the Holly Cities and being provider of the Hajj traffic16. 
Ottoman State was carrying on its authority on the Red Sea and Northeastern Africa by means of its Egypt 
province. Egypt was an important place to control Hajj traffic. A strong and free of inner problems Egypt 
administration was providing both Egypt’s security and security of the region that went over to the Indian Ocean, 
and was holding the authority in the name of Ottoman Padishahs. During the eras in which it was capable to 
prevent interference of outer forces, Ottoman State was successful in controlling the problems in Egypt. When 
Ottoman State got weak especially after 1774, it had some problems in controlling events in Egypt. Since then, 
there occurred a change in both the number of actors who interfere the problems of Egypt and actors’ aims17. 
When France invaded Egypt on 1st July 1798, Ottoman State needed to take support of Britain and Russia18.As a 
result, French, who were defeated in the wars against Ottoman- Russian- English alliance, left Egypt on 1st August 
1801.Ottoman Padishah assigned Mehmet Ali Pasha as the governor of Egypt in May – Jun 180519. 
Mehmet Ali Pasha governed very successfully after his appointment. At first, he tried to provide geographic 
and administrative unity of Egypt. He performed both his military talents and political talents successfully20.  
Pasha proved his power once again by suppressing the Wahabi revolt that was threatening psychologically the 
legality of Ottoman State and the governor of Baghdad and Damascus could not cope with21. After 1815, Pasha 
speeded up expansion operation towards both Syria and South Africa with challenging his neighborhoods22. He 
increased the number of soldiers in his army by enlisting native Egyptians during 1820s. Because developments 
resulted in fertility in agriculture and the expansion of borders with conquests, the population of Egypt increased 
in great amounts23. Mehmet Ali Pasha, who used this for his benefit, made the Egyptian army such an armed force 
containing a hundred thousand soldiers24. 
Also Ottoman State was supporting Mehmet Ali’s conquests in the south, because the concentration of this 
rebellious governor to south relieved the Ottoman Padishahs. Egyptian armies rebelled and defeated Ottoman 
armies twice in 1831 and 1839. Ottoman State could only get rid of this hard situation with the help of the big 
foreign states25. According to London Conference gathered in 1840, autonomy of Egypt to Ottoman State was 
declared. 26. With the Padishah Abdulmecit’s firman in 1841, governor status became special to Mehmet Ali’s 
dynasty. A governor dynasty tied to Ottoman State founded in Egypt27. In fact, those privileges of Egypt put 
Ottoman State on a road without returning. When Ottoman State wanted to take a decision about Egypt, it had to 
consider the foreign states thoughts. Thus, Mehmet Ali Pasha stroke the stabilized atmosphere constituted by 
Ottoman State in the region. Foreign powers gradually leaked into to the region after 1830s28. 
There were two main principles in Mehmet Ali Pasha’s successful politics in Egypt. The first one was his 
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guarding the lands without needed Ottoman State’s help, and thus, he proved his worth by gaining autonomy from 
Babiali’s orders29. The second one was the politics that regarded security against European powers as a matter of 
primary importance30. When the expansion of Egypt towards Syria was prevented by the big powers, Mehmet Ali 
turned his expansion strategy towards the south31. With the addition of Sudan into Egypt with an army operation, 
Mehmet Ali Pasha captured Hajj and trade roads from the Northern Africa to Mecca32. He established Hartum as a 
center in order to make people work in irrigation of Egypt’s agricultural areas and provide manpower for the 
army33. Through the end of 1830s, English intervened Mehmet Ali Pasha’s conquer activities in Ethiopia. In spite 
of this, he captured Take (Taha) lands whose capital was Kassala in 1840. Sudan contained its province Nubia, 
Dafur, Cordovan, and Bahr el-Gazel. Among them Cordovan and Bahr el-Gazel had been known as Ottoman 
lands. These lands were left to Mehmet Ali Pasha administration with the firman dated 184134. After Mehmet Ali 
Pasha’s death in 1849, Suakin and Massawa were left to the administration of Hijaz governor. At this time, the 
dominance of Egypt was expanded to Fasoda and Beja region at the north part of Nil, to Kassala and to Take on 
the Ethiopian border.  
When Ismail Pasha became the governor, he tried to strengthen the sovereignty of Egypt on the coasts of the 
Red Sea in the name of Ottoman State. Also the king of Ethiopia, Tevodros (1855- 1868) wanted to take 
Massawa, an important a port city of the Red Sea. For this reason, he followed the politics about provoking 
European powers, such as Britain and France, against Ottoman State. But he failed in what he wanted. During this 
era, Ottoman State pretended to have rights on the lands from Ethiopian province to Bab el-Mendeb. Khedive 
Ismail Pasha’s era in Egypt (1862- 1879) started a new expansion operation in the region. The administration of 
Suakin and Massawa were added to Egyptian administration in 186535. Although Ottoman State looked 
suspiciously, it supported Khedive Ismail’s military expeditions in the coasts of the Red Sea and in Sudan and in 
the Northeastern Africa consists of Ethiopia and Somali. Because the re-conquer of the lands, which were lost due 
to various reasons, or conquer of some lands for the first time pleased the Ottoman bureaucrats.  
After the opening of Suez Canal in 1869, Britain did not wanted the rival states to have the right to comment 
on the Red Sea and Aden Bay. In this respect, they took pains not to produce a problem and they accepted the 
expansion of Egypt for their benefit. Because they thought that it would be easier to take these places from Egypt. 
Khedive Ismail Pasha continued to capture the coasts of the Red Sea. He managed to capture Barbera in 1867 and 
Zeila in 1875. Massawa was used as a base in Egyptian expansion in the Red Sea. Swiss Munzinger, who was the 
governor of this place in 1871, carried on this expansion politics very successfully in the name of Ismail Pasha. 
Munzinger organized two military expeditions towards Ethiopia under the command of Danish Abrendrup Pasha 
and Mehmet Ratıp Pasha. But he failed. With these attempts, Ismail Pasha tried to expand Egypt towards lakes 
district whose center was in Africa and Uganda36. 
Ismail Pasha preferred to use European officers in his military expeditions in the region. In 1877, he 
appointed English Gordon to the governor of Sudan. In the same year, English accepted the Ottoman sovereignty 
in Ras Hafun in Egypt according to the agreement between Britain and Egypt37. 
  
E. Sudan Question And Ottoman Response 
  After England’s recognition and appreciation of the importance of Egypt’s geographical position and 
its effect on trade with India, she tried to acguire a certain influence in Egypt. England’s policy towards Egypt was 
realized through flooding her with debts which led to the foreign intervention represented in the finanacial control 
and the participation of foreign ministers in the Egyptian Cabinet, towards the end of Khediv Ismail (1863-1879)’s 
reign. Foreign influence and intervention ended with the British occupation of Egypt in 1882. The British 
occupation led to some measures which had their most dangerous effect on the situation in both Egypt and the 
Sudan.  
The Sudan revolution started as a religious movement in the south of Vadi Halfa in Apa Island in White Nile 
in July 1881. The event that eventually led to the rebellion was a row between the Faşoda director, tax-farmer in 
the name of Egypt, and Muhammed Ahmed, son of a caique master. Soon after this case, Muhammed Ahmed 
announced in Ramadan (August 1881), the holy month of Muslims, that he was Mahdi38.  
Al Mahdi was calling for the eradication of injustice and the unfair taxation. He threw the responsibility of 
these injustices on the shoulder of the Egyptian government for employing foreign servicemen who mistreated the 
Sudanese people. The Mahdi movement enjoyed a strong popular support in Sudan. Those supporting the Mahdi 
can be divided into three groups: a) Dervishes well knowing about Muhammed Ahmed, believing that he was 
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Mahdi, and being committed to him unconditionally; b) the tribes living along the banks of Nil, and subsisting on 
slave trade; c) the tribes opposing all kinds of state authority, such as "Baggara" and "Bija". The latter were of the 
conviction that their interests had been exterminated by regulations of a high authority, like tax collecting39.  
The Mahdi realized structuring of his organization by imitating the Prophet and the first ages of Islam, as his 
rebellion movement bore a religious character. He called his armed forces "Ensar", while tribal chiefs near to him 
were being titled with "Khalifa"40. 
It is not yet known well whether there was a connection between this Mahdi rebellion and the Urabî Pasha 
movement, which rose in Egypt and lead to British invasion of the country in 1882. But the both rebellious 
movements occurred in a very near time interval and in neighboring regions. One can mention about, at least, their 
psychological interaction of each other. Urabî Pasha started a protest movement against keeping of Circassian and 
Turkish officers high ranks in the army and against economical and political press of Europeans in Egypt, by 
relying on masses that were uncomfortable with this situation. Mahdi did the same exploiting reactions against 
Egyptian administration in Sudan and colonialist policies of Europeans41. In this respect, given that Urabî Pasha 
developed a discourse against hegemony rights of the Ottoman Empire, the both movements prove to have a 
common point of view. The Mahdi movement in Sudan can be qualified as an uprising against the immediate 
owners of hegemony and interference of Europeans, as does Egyptian Urabi movement. What calls for attention at 
this point is that Sudan was under Ottoman rule as part of the Khedive administration of Egypt. The uprising in 
Sudan was a worry directed to the Egyptian Khedivate rather than being a struggle to escape the Ottoman rule. 
However, he claimed that his rebellion  was not aganist the Ottoman Empire. 
Abdülhamid the Second, then Ottoman sultan, also considered the Sudan case in such a way. In his opinion, 
the Sudan problem arose due to that Britain had put out of the running order in Egypt. This case would not happen 
if there had not been an administrative vacuum in Egypt42. Compared to the Wahhabi movement, although Mahdi 
directly targeted Pan-Islamist policies of Abdülhamid the Second, by his claims of being "savior of Muslims", he 
did not pose an ideological threat as did the former from the Ottoman point of view. On the other hand, authority 
of the Egyptian Khedivate which had extended to all of Sudan under Ismail Pasha, weakened after the financial 
crisis in Egypt. Particularly after Tevfik Pasha became khedive, there appeared an administrative vacuum in 
Sudan, since the Egyptian government paid all attention to the Urabî Pasha movement43. It should be kept in mind 
that this vacuum had great effect on the Mahdi rebellion. Mahdi did many assaults between the years 1881-1883, 
during which many Egyptian soldiers died44. British troops, which had been stationed in Tel al-Kabîr by the 
beginning of 1883, then gradually started to base along the lower ranks of the Nile Valley.  
British representatives faced to some problems in Egypt, as they could not set up a strict administrative 
mechanism45. They could not take the developments in Sudan because of their business with solution of these 
problems in Egypt. But after the rebellion well spread out, they accepted the policy that this question should be 
handed within the frame of the Egyptian question. The khedive, the Sultan and the British government did not 
have a consensus on who was in the source of the turmoil in Sudan. While the Ottoman government and the 
khedive were blaming Britain, the latter claimed that the Ottomans and the Egyptian administration were 
responsible for these events. Britain, in this context, suggested that the Ottoman State should have controlled the 
developments by sending its troops to the region46.  
From the Ottoman point of view, the solution to end the Sudan rebellion was not sending Ottoman troops 
there, but evacuation of British forces from Egypt. Abdülhamid the Second tried for adoption of a pluralist policy, 
by bringing the army sending issue to the meeting of "Majlîs-i Vukelâ Heyeti" (Council of Assembly of Deputies). 
Members of the Assembly decided that the British offer that Sudan should have separated from Egypt and 
governed directly by the Porte was not acceptable, though it was under authorization of the Ottoman Empire, since 
the Egyptian Khedive had not demanded such a practice. In addition, members of the Deputies Assembly agreed 
on that sending Ottoman army to Sudan would harm interests of the state in every condition47. By the way, Britain 
was keeping its position in claiming that task of the British soldiers in Egypt was not up yet, by the pretext that the 
turmoil in Sudan was posing a continuous threat to the security of Egypt. Britain made use of this case not to 
evacuate its troops in Egypt48. 
 Britain, on the other hand, responded negatively to military aid demands of the Egyptian Khedive to solve 
the Sudan question. It is possible to consider this British policy both as that London did not know what to do after 
invading Egypt and had no determined policies, which was result of its unplanned acts, and as exploiting the 
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Sudan case to remain in Egypt. Given the earlier British promises to abandon Egypt, it is obvious that the London 
governments used the Sudan events as a pretext not to carry out its commitments. Khedive Tevfik Pasha called 
and employed a British veteran to command Egyptian troops to suppress the Sudan rebellion. William Hicks went 
to Sudan in command of 10.000 Egyptian soldiers to fight the Mahdi forces. The latter had the Egyptian forces 
tasted a heavy defeat in the battle in al-Ubeyd region, November, 5, 1883, which was a dramatic surprise for the 
British side49.In the battle, in which William Hicks lost his life, very few Egyptian soldiers managed to survive50. 
They withdrew to fortresses that were under direct Khedive administration. After this victory, supporters of Mahdi 
started to threat Khartoum, by enjoying support of the tribes around Sevâkîn51. 
Though the Egyptian army, which faced a massacre in real sense, continued to dominate some fortresses in 
the country, Mahdi seized de facto control of Sudan after his victory. After this failure, the British government 
headed by Gladstone decided to withdraw its forces from Vadi Halfa. Sir Evelyn Wood suggested to Tevfik Pasha 
and the British government to fix borders of the Egyptian Khedivateon the condition of not being far from South 
Asvan52. The British side, positively approaching to this offer, divided Egypt and Sudan with a line through Vadi 
Halfa. As early as January 1884, the British authorities to provide security for Egypt closed this border. But 
official statement regarding this practice was made on May 11, 1885. In spite of the fact that turmoil in Sudan 
caused by the Mahdi advanced too much, Gladstone did not want any risk for British soldiers to control the 
developments. Instead, the London government steadily pressed on the Ottoman Empire to send troops there, as 
legal owner of hegemony53.  
The Ottoman government discussed the issue of sending army to Sudan, its right according to international 
rules, in commissions established by Abdülhamid the Second. After many debates on possible consequences of 
this policy, Abdülhamid rejected sending military forces, regarding it harmful to the interests of the state54. Lives 
of soldiers of the Egyptian army, who were pinched in fortresses in Sudan, were under threat of the Mahdi forces. 
Rescuing them remained as a serious problem. Egyptian people, first of all, families of these soldiers, were in 
great anxiety about lives of these soldiers before the supporters of Mahdi, who had massacred thousands of 
Egyptian soldiers. London was in dilemma; it did not want to take any risk by joining this rescue operation, in 
order not to experience a new W. Hicks case. But the British government, eventually being helpless, decided to 
send General George Gordon for this task55. Gordon had had a good military career. He had proved himself firstly 
in the Balaclava battle with the Chinese in 1860. When Khedive Ismail Pasha prohibited slave trade, he charged 
Gordon in 1874, to prevent human smuggling in Sudan56. 
From then on the year 1879, Gordon, as governor general, had left a good impression on local forces and 
especially tribal chiefs by establishing good relations with them57.It was well known how General Gordon's task 
dangerous was. Just as, nobody volunteered for this operation, except him. Thus, British officers appreciated 
him58. Gordon arrived at Cairo on January 24, 1884. He went to Khartoum via the river and by caravans on 
February 22. He announced here in his first statement that he returned to govern Sudan, with an authority above 
tribal chiefs, by the decree of the Khedive. However, when Gordon transmitted his plan to the higher ranks to go 
to the south and establish a garrison in Bahr al-Gazal, together with troops of the Khedive, the Gladstone 
government started to evaluate this new situation in a different way. Gladstone doubted that he would agree with 
the Belgian King, with the pretext of providing security in the borders of Belgian Congo, within the frame of this 
plan. In addition, he was anxious of Gordon's probable passion of leadership in the region in the name of the 
Belgian King. Acting by this supposition, Gladstone decreed him to return to Egypt and leave the Sudan people to 
get their liberty themselves59. Gordon could not receive this order at that time, because supporters of Mahdi had 
destroyed all telegraph lines even before he arrived at Khartoum. After these developments, the Mahdi forces 
seized Khartoum and besieged the quarter around the government building, in which was Gordon, British 
commandant of the Egyptian army. Gladstone ordered Sir Wolseley on August 22, 1884, to go to Sudan to rescue 
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Gordon. General Sir Wolseley reached Khartoum on January 28, 1885, after a long and onerous journey together 
with a force of 10.000 soldiers. But he was too late. Men of Mahdi had killed Gordon two days ago Moreover, 
they challenged to the Britain by cutting off the general's head60. The rescue force under Wolseley did some 
military activities in Sevâkîn and Sudan, within the context of its duty61. But they had to return to Egypt, being not 
able to do anything for the essential task. This situation that posed a serious threat to British presence in Egypt 
forced London to develop new policies. 
 By the way, new policies of the Ottomans to suppress the Sudan rebellion by referring to the Khalifate 
authority gained actuality. In other words, Britain needed political and military support of the Ottoman State to 
provide security in Egypt. That Britain expressed this necessity was very important in showing that the Ottoman 
State was still a determinant factor in the Egypt issue. Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, high commissary of the 
Ottoman State for Egypt, proposed some solutions. But Britain did not tend to accept them. The pasha, on the 
other hand, was continuously sending reports to Istanbul on the British effort of dropping the issue of evacuation 
of Egypt, by organizing the events in Sudan62.  
Another conviction of Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha was that Sudan was as important as Egypt in term of its 
Indian and Red Sea politics from the British view. Thus, they were trying to separate Sudan from Egypt and take 
under their suzerainty. They wanted to invade Sudan referring the same justifications as they used in their 
invasion of Egypt63. These different approaches between the sides were again actualized, as before-mentioned, 
due to the last developments in Khartoum. The Mahdi forces had to withdraw from Khartoum, after Wolseley's 
forces arrived there. That the Sudan rebellion, continuously complained about as a threat, started to loose its 
dynamism let the Ottoman side to launch a new political attack. After the withdrawal, the Mahdi forces started to 
gather in the town Omdurman, opposite to Khartoum, on the White Nile. They started also to turn the town into 
their capital city, but did not live much to see its completion; he died in June 1885 due to an unexpected disease64.  
After his demise, activities of the Sudan rebels continued without any interruption. Abdullah, taking the title 
"Khalifa" replaced Mahdi as leader65. But after this date, the Sudan crisis lost its actuality in terms of the Egypt 
questionThe British government was convicted that it could not set up an order in Sudan as in Egypt 66.Meanwhile, 
it tried to develop new policies, with the anxiety that the loss of prestige that it faced in Sudan and the legality 
issue would affect Egypt, too. The forces of Mahdi and the Khedive fought in the Vadi Halfa region, where 
Britain had drew the border, for 11 years, with some interruptions. Britain learned in 1896 that France attempted 
to enter the Upper Nile region from the west. There were gossips that Leopold, Belgian King, also would act in 
the same manner.  
Another country racing to get some share was Italy. Italians determined Ethiopia to be their new target, after 
they invaded Musawwa in 1885. Italy, moving in this direction, did not give up its imperialist passions, in spite of 
the unexpected defeat of its forces in Adova. Lord Salisbury, wanting to reinforce British presence in Egypt and 
Vadi Nil in the light of these developments, decided to invade Sudan on March 17, 1896. British forces realized 
this aim by completing invasion of Sudan.  
The Ottoman State failed in its diplomatic struggle against Britain, France and Italy along the shores of the 
Red Sea to prevent invasions of these colonialist powers. But it prevented their easily swallowing of these regions. 
Diplomatically, it continuously tried to keep its right of hegemony in these regions, which belonged to it 
according to international laws. In this respect, it delayed, at least, colonization of the region by European powers.  
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